UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Ninth Circuit
No. 90-55397
WILLIAM DAUBERT; JOYCE DAUBERT, individually and
as Guardians Ad Litem for JASON DAUBERT, a minor;
ANITA DE YOUNG, individually, and As Guardian Ad Litem
for ERIC SCHULLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern
District of California
(December 20, 1991)
Before: Alex Kozinski and Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Circuit Judges,
and Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge.
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller suffer from limb reduction birth defects. They allege that these defects resulted from the fact that their mothers used Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug, during pregnancy. The plaintiffs seek damages from the drug's manufacturer, defendant Merrell Dow Pharnaceuticals.
Plaintiffs' evidence of causation consisted primarily of expert opinion based on in vitro and in vivo animal tests, chemical structure analyses and the reanalysis of epidemiological studies. Among the contrary evidence proffered by Merrell Dow was the affidavit of a physician and epidemiologist who reviewed all of the available literature on the subject, which includes more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients, and concluded that no published epidemiological study had demonstrated a statistically significant association between Bendectin and birth defects. Plaintiffs do not challenge this summary of the published record.
The district court determined that plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proving that Bendectin caused Jason's and Eric's birth defects and granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment.
For expert opinion based on a given scientific methodology to be admissible, the methodology cannot diverge significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field. If it does so diverge, it cannot be to be 'generally accepted as a reliable technique,' and a district court must exclude it. If such evidence is admitted and materially affects the verdict, a judgment supported by this evidence cannot stand.
Plaintiffs argue that reanalysis is a generally accepted scientific technique, so it follows that their experts were basing their opinions on a permissible methodology. But the reanalysis of epidemiological studies is generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field. Plaintiffs reanalyses do not comply with this standard; they were unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process, and generated solely for use in litigation.' It does not suffice that the expert's methodology meet some of the requirements imposed by the scientific community; it must meet all of the essential requirements. Selective borrowing from generally accepted scientific methodology does not satisfy Solomon's rigorous standard.
AFFIRMED.